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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case resul~in~ from a 
rear-end collision involving vehicles driven by the p~rties. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Sharon Collier, sustained severe 
physical injuries. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In November, 1979, a jury in Uintah County returned 
a verdict of no cause of action against Mrs. Collier. Her 
motion for a new trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Sharon Collier, seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court and a new trial on all issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 9, 1976, Defendant struck the rear of 
Mrs. Collier's vehicle at a point 1.7 miles south of Vernal 
on Vernal Avenue. The road was snow-packed and slippery 
and it was dark and there were no street lights. Mrs. Col-
lier was driving a Datsun Pickup and her tail lights were 
on and working properly. In addition, the pickup had a camp-
er shell on it with clearance lights which were also on 
and working properly. 
Because of the deep snow conditions, ~rs. Collier's 
vehicle had been towed from her driveway onto the road by 
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her husband. She was traveling at about 10 mph on the snow-
packed road and had been on the road long enough to observe 
Defendant approaching from about 500 yards back. 
Defendant was approaching at about 35 mph and, just 
before the collision, he applied his brakes, skidded side-
ways and collided with Mrs. Collier's vehicle at a speed 
of about 20 mph. He testified that he did not see her until 
he reached a point about 75 feet from impact. 
As a consequence of this accident, Mrs. Collier 
has sustained physical injuries, the effects of which con-
tinue to the present time. The medical expenses and other 
special damages exceed $3,500.00. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
sets forth the grounds for grantfng a new trial as follows: 
Rule 59(a) Grounds. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing 
to have been given under the influence of pas-
sion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against the law. 
(7) Error in law. 
In Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 
(1958), a case with several similarities to this case, this 
-2-
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Court ~eviewed the facts ~fter the jury returned A verdict 
of no cause of action. It was determined that there w~s 
ample evidence to support a verdict for the Plaintiff and 
that it did not support the verdict rendered. The Court 
concluded that a new trial was proper. In this case appe~l 
by Mrs. Collier, there is also ample evidence that Defendant 
was negligent, and none to show that he acted reasonably 
under the circumstances. 
POINT I 
IT IS NEGLIGENCE FOR A DRIVER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE TO 
FAIL TO KNOW THAT THE ROADWAY AHEAD IS CLEAR AND SAFE 
FOR HIM TO TRAVEL AT THE SPEED WHICH HE IS MAINTAINING. 
Common sense alone tells us that it would be negli-
gence for a driver of a motor vehicle to proceed on a public 
roadway without knowing whether there are any obstacles 
in his path. It is further obvious to a reasonable person 
that it would be negligence to proceed, knowing that an 
obstacle is or may be in the roadway, without assuring ones-
self that he has the capability of stopping before hitting 
the obstacle. 
In the recent case of Keller v. Shelley, 551 P.2d 
513 (1976), this Court said: 
It has been the law of this state ever since 
Dalle v. Mid-Western Dair Products Co.: that 
an it is ne~ igence as a matter o aw for 
a person torive an automobile upon a trav7led 
public highway used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
-3-
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at such a rate of speed that said vehicle cannot 
be stopped within the distance at which the 
operator of said car is able to see objects 
upon the highway in front of him. (Emphasis 
added.) 
See also, Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 15 P.2d 
309 (Utah 1932), which adopted the above language and legal 
doctrine. 
In Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975), 
the Defendant was distracted by a vehicle approaching the 
street from a driveway. Upon looking back to the street 
ahead, he found that he was too close to Plaintiff's car, 
which was stopped for a traffic signal, to avoid a colli-
sion. The court's decision reflected the obvious when it 
said: 
It is the duty of a driver of a motor vehicle 
to see or to know, from having seen, that the 
highway ahead of him is clear.and safe for him 
to travel at the speed which he is maintaining, 
and it is ne~ligence for him to fail to do so. 
(Emphasis ad ed.) 
Although the court found unusual circumstances in 
Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975), it stated 
that: 
... In most cases where our car 'rear-ends' an-
other it accords with common sense and ex eri-
ence to e ieve t at t e o owing car as is-
regarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead and 
keep the car under control and is, therefore, 
at fault. (Emphasis added.) 
In that case, the driver of the lead vehicle was driving 
-4-
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erratically and the jury returned a verd~ct of no cause 
of action in favor of the driver of the followinc car. This 
Court decreed that circumstances May alter the deter~ination 
that the following car had disregarded its duty of c~re 
and said, "In order to make that determination, it is our 
duty to review the evidence under the assumption that the 
jury believed those aspects of it which support their ver-
dict." Id. P. 191. 
Such would be the duty of this Court in this case. 
Here the jury found contrary to "common sen.se and experi-
ence." It is necessary to determine whether the evidence 
supports that finding. Appellant contends that it does not, 
not because such evidence is weak, but because it is virt-
ually non-existent. This is brought out more fully in Point 
II of this brief. It is "negligence as a matter of law" 
to drive at such a rate of speed that a vehicle cannot be 
stopped in time to avoid hitting objects within the sight 
of the driver, then the evidence in this case required a 
finding in favor of ~rs. Collier. There was no clear and 
direct evidence that this case would fall in the category 
of exceptions contemplated by Bullock, Supra. The only evi-
dence of negligence adduced related to that of the Defen-
dant. 
-5-
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
The trial court determined that Mrs. Collier was 
not negligent and said: 
the Court has now concluded as a matter 
of law that Plaintiff, Sharon Collier, was not 
negligent in driving her vehicle.(Tr. 140-41, 
L. 29 to L.l.) 
In light of the evidence presented in the trial, that conclu-
sion was proper. 
In consequence of the above, the cause of the action 
could only be attributed to the negligence of the Defendant, 
or to an Act of God. The latter alternative has never been 
claimed, intimated or argued. The facts would not justify 
it. The evidence, however, clearly demonstrates the neglig-
ence of the Defendant. On the evening of the accident, the 
conditions were described as "dark, no street lights, snowy, 
slippery and cloudy" (Tr., P.25, L.32, P.26, L.l) by the 
investigating officer, a situation that would require more 
than normal caution. These conditions were verified by the 
t~stimony of the Defendant: 
"Q. . .. Do you have any dispute about this 
road being snow-packed? 
A. It was snow-packed. 
Q. It was snow-packed? 
-6-
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A. (the witness nodded his head.)" (Tr. P. ~1. 
Ll. 10-14.) 
And further: 
also: 
"Q. It (the snow) was all packed down. Was it 
slippery? 
A. Yes . " (Tr. , P. 81 , L 1 . 21- 2 2 . ) 
"Q. And you had been traveling. well, even back 
beyond 2500 South when you had been on a 
slippery surface that whole way. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you applied your brakes at any other 
place? 
A. Yes. When I was going out there, I'd stop 
at signs and stuff. 
Q. So you knew it was slick? 
A. Well, I didn't spin out or nothing. I just 
made it----" (Tr., P.86, LL 119-28.) 
The Plaintiff also testified that the road was "very 
slick," (Tr., P.40, LL 17-18,) and snow-packed, (Tr., P.40, 
Ll. 11-13.) Plaintiff's husband confirmed the condition 
of the road as brought out by the testimony of the police 
officer and the parties, (Tr., P.102, Ll. 3-10.) 
Under such conditions it is obvious that the Defen-
dant should have been maintaining a high standard of care 
to allow him to guard against possible danger. He should 
not only have been driving at a reduced speed, but should 
-7-
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also have been keeping an extra cautious lookout. Testimony 
demonstrate that he was doing neither. 
The accident was determined by the investigating 
officer to have been caused by the Defendant, with no con-
tributing cause on the part of Plaintiff. {Tr., Pp. 28-29) 
In fact, the Defendant was described as driving "too fast" 
(Tr., P.29, L. 13) and keeping an "improper lookout" (Tr., 
P.29, L.15). 
Defendant admitted both to the investigating officer 
at the scene (Tr., P.31, LL 2-3) and in testimony at court 
that he was traveling at a speed of 35 mph for some time 
preceeding the accident. (Tr., P.85, Ll. 2-13.) With the 
road conditions as described, reason alone would question 
whether 35 mph was a safe speed to maintain. However, those 
who saw him approaching were immediately aware that he 
seemed to be driving "quite fast," {Tr., P.92, LL 21-22), 
"faster than I would drive in a car on that type of condi-
tions." {Tr., P.103, Ll. 2-3.) There seems to have been 
ample grounds for Defendant's being cited by the investigat-
ing officer for driving too fast. Although the testimony 
is in accord with the proposition that the Defendant was 
driving too fast, the physical evidence is simple but over-
whelming in showing negligence in the speed he was maintain-
ing. Concerning this, the Defendant's testimony was as fol-
lows: 
-8-
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"Q. But you did when you got to this point say 
you observed at least her tail lights. (IndL-
cating) What did you do? 
A. I hit the brakes, and I put one hand on the 
horn. And she knew I was coming. And the car 
slid sideways, and I kind of str3ightened--rt' 
out, but it just keot going, and then stopped 
at the impact. (Emphasis added.) (Tr., P.85, 
Ll. 25-30.) 
Obviously, Defendant was going so fast that he did not have 
control of his vehicle when he became aware of a hazard 
in the roadway ahead. 
Furthermore, the record is replete with testimony 
that the Defendant was maintaining an improper lookout. 
From the evidence at the scene, the investigating officer 
so concluded. (Tr., P.29, L.15.) The Defendant testified 
that he was about 75 feet from the Plaintiff's car before 
he saw her, (Tr., P.82, Ll. 4-1,) that is, he had passed 
Plaintiff's husband who was stopped, waiting to turn into 
his driveway. The accident was measured to have occurred 
76 feet past the driveway. (Tr., P.27, Ll. 4-8.) Under ideal 
road conditions, Defendant might have been able to stop 
within that distance upon discovering a hazard. Under snowy, 
slippery conditions it was impossible. Plaintiff had ob-
served Defendant approaching for some 500 yards. (Tr., P.42, 
Ll. 7-9.) Defendant testified that Plaintiff's car had tail 
lights and that he saw them {Tr., P.82, Ll. 15-20). Plain-
tiff's husband testified that not only were there tail 
-9-
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lights on Plaintiff's Pickup, but it also had three or four 
lights across the top of the camper shell. (Tr., P.96, Ll. 
10-25.) In spite of this testimony which showed that Plain-
tiff's car was clearly visible, and that the view was unob-
structed for at least 500 yards when Plaintiff first saw 
Defendant, Defendant still did not see Plaintiff in time 
to avoid a collision. 
Not only does the evidence show that Defendant was 
traveling at a speed which prevented him from stopping to 
avoid collision with a vehicle properly on the roadway, 
but he traveled almost 500 yards after it became visible 
to him before he actually saw it. By that time his excessive 
speed made it impossible to stop in time to avoid the acci-
dent. Under existing Utah law, there was clearly an adQquate 
showing that Defendant was negligent and a verdict to the 
contrary is both against the evidence and against the law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is conceded that there may be instances where 
a rear-end collision could result from circumstances other 
than the negligence of the following driver. The Bullock 
case, supra, is such a case where the lead car was driven 
erratically, making unexpected stops and starts. 
In this case, however, Mrs. Collier was doing noth-
-10-
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ing thAt a reasonable driver wouldn't do under the circum-
stances. The defendant was cited for driving "too fast" and 
keeping an "improper lookout." 'Jhen he saw '-\rs. Collier's 
vehicle he was not able to stop in time to avoid hitting 
her. Since 1932, when Dallev, supra, was decided. that has 
been negligence as a matter of law. 
A verdict of no cause of action is clearly contrary 
to the law. The consequent failure to award any damage in 
light of the overwhelming evidence of negligence and the 
undisputed evidence of damages can only be explained in 
terms of passion or prejudice. 
The judgment on the verdict in this case should 
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 7th day of April, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHMAN & WRIGHT 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to: JOHN M. 
CHIPMAN, Attorney for Respondent, 702 Kearns Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid on this 7th. day of 
April, 1980. 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
